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CRIMINAL LAW
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING

McGee v. United States
Appellate review of criminal sentencing is not a new concept but,
in recent years, the need for such a policy on the federal level has become increasingly apparent. Substantial discrepancies in sentences imposed in "draft-dodging" cases have provided significant impetus for
limiting the trial judge's almost unlimited discretion. In McGee v. United States,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2 reached a decision that, if followed, could limit sentencing disparities in such cases.
McGee was convicted of violating four provisions of the Selective
Service Act of 1967, 3 the most serious being his refusal to submit to induction into the Army.4 The trial judge imposed sentences of two years
for each of the counts, the sentences to run concurrently.5 Subsequently,
McGee's conviction under count 1 (refusing induction) was set aside,
and he moved under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suspension or reduction of the sentences under the subordinate counts and release on probation.7 Judge Murphy of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion. The
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the trial judge's
denial of the motion must be accompanied by "at least a summary explanation of his reasons for declining to do so."' 8
1462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972).
2 Opinion by Friendly, C.J. The tie-breaking vote was cast by Judge Jameson of the
United States District Court for the District of Montana sitting by designation. 462 F.2d
at 244.
a 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (1970). The four counts involved were refusing to submit
to induction (Count 1), failing to report for a physical examination (Count 2), failing to
possess a valid notice of classification (Count 3) and failing to return a current information

questionnaire to his local draft board (Count 4). See United States v. McGee, 426 F.2d 691
(2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
4 There is little doubt that, had the defendant not committed the violations alleged in
count 1, he would not have been prosecuted for the violations alleged in counts 2, 3 and 4.
A government publication by the Selective Service System remarks that, unless a male of
draft age refuses to register or refuses to submit to induction, other violations of the Selective Service Act of 1967 will usually be processed administratively and will not lead to
criminal prosecutions. 462 F.2d at 246.
5 United States v. McGee, 426 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
6 McGee's conviction was set aside with the consent of the government after defendant
had moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) to vacate the conviction and sentence under
count I because he had been unlawfully accelerated for induction. 462 F.2d at 244. See
Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970).

7462 F.2d at 247.
8462 F.2d at 244. McGee simultaneously moved to set aside the judgments and sentences on the remaining counts or, in the alternative, for a new trial on counts 2, 3 and
4 under Fm. R. Csum. P. 33.
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Rule 35 provides three separate and distinct means of relief: correction of an illegal sentence 9 correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 0 and reduction of a legal sentence. It is this last procedure that is involved in McGee.
A Rule 35 motion "is essentially a plea for leniency and presupposes a valid conviction."'" The trial court is, in effect, being asked to
reconsider its original verdict. The court may, in its discretion, reduce
12
the sentence with or without additional information at its disposal.
Rule 95 does not require that the defendant be present or that the
13
court hear testimony or arguments on the motion.
Prior to the adoption of the rule, a trial court could modify a valid
sentence only during the term of court at which the sentence was imposed.' 4 Rule 35 substituted a time limitation of 120 days which cannot be extended.' 5 Any motion made after the expiration of the time
9 The text of the rule reads: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time...." FE. R. Carn. P. 35. An illegal sentence is one in excess of the maximum authorized by statute. Ruiz v. United States, 865 F.2d 500, 502 (Sd Cir. 1966).-It also encom-

passes a sentence in violation of any other applicable statute as, for example, where a
trial judge makes provision for parole where none is authorized. Robinson v. United
States, 813 F.2d 817, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1963).
lo "[A]nd may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner...." FED. R. Cum. P.
35. A Rule 35 motion to correct a sentence illegally imposed must be made within the
time allowed to reduce a valid sentence, i.e., within 120 days from the day of sentencing,
from the day of the court's receipt "of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment
or dismissal of the appeal," or from "entry of an order or judgment of the Supreme
Court. . . having the effect of upholding a judgment or conviction." Id.
The question still to be decided in this area is whether a sentence imposed in defendant's absence is illegally imposed within the meaning of this rule. Cf. Walsh v. United
States, 374 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1967) (not illegal). But cf. Bartone v. United States, 375
U.S. 52 (1963) (illegal).
11 Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also United States v.
Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968).
12 Without additional information, a court may, for the same reasons that led to its
original sentence, be reluctant to reduce a penalty. Realistically, mitigating circumstances
either unknown or misunderstood at the original sentencing must be brought forth for the
motion to have any chance of success. Cf. United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Harden, 9 F.R.D. 258, 259 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
13Jacobsen v. United States, 260 F.2d 122, 123 (8th Cir. 1958).
14 The original Committee Note to Rule 35 reads in part:
The second sentence introduces a flexible time limitation on the power of the
court to reduce a sentence, in lieu of the present limitation of the term of court.
Rule 45(c) abolishes the expiration of a term of court as a time limitation, thereby
necessitating the introduction of a specific time limitation as to all proceedings
now governed by the term of court as a limitation. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule 6(c)) . . . abolishes the expiration of a term of court as a time
limitation in respect to civil actions. The two rules together thus do away with
the significance of the expiration of a term of court which has largely become
an anachronism.
1 U.S.C. App. at 4508 (1970).
15 The original time limit was 60 days, extended to 120 days by a 1966 amendment.
The 1966 Committee Note to Rule 35 reads in part:
The second sentence has been amended to increase the time within which the
court may act from 60 days to 120 days. The 60 day period is frequently too short
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period will not be entertained. 6 In addition, a motion to reduce a valid
sentence cannot be entertained during the pendency of an appeal.' 7
In McGee, the court noted that the trial judge's original determination of sentence was based on appellant's conviction of all four
charges and did not take into account the subsequent reversal of the
count 1 conviction. The court felt that, as a result, the judge was probably partly influenced, even as to the counts 2 through 4 sentences, by
the constitutionally invalid count 1 conviction. "If such were in fact the
case, appellant's initial sentences under counts 2 through 4 would require reconsideration."' 18 The Second Circuit also noted that the usual
appellate procedure in cases where invalid convictions may have influenced a sentence is to vacate and remand for resentencing on the valid
counts. However, due to the Rule 35 motion in this case, the trial court
had already had an opportunity to reconsider the sentences on the three
valid counts. Thus, McGee had exhausted the normal chain of remedies but the court of appeals, in a singular decision, ordered the trial
judge to either alter the original sentence or justify his failure to do
so.

19

to enable the defendant to obtain and file the evidence, information
been
has argua defendant and
ment to support a reduction in sentence. Especially where
committed to an institution at a distance from the sentencing court, the delays
involved in institutional mail inspection procedures and the time required to
contact relatives, friends and counsel may result in the 60-day period passing before
the court is able to consider the case.
Id.
16 See United States v. Koneski, 323 F.2d 862, 863 (4th Cir. 1963); Urry v. United States,
316 F.2d 185, 186 (10th Cir. 1963).
17 See United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.

836 (1963).
18 462 F.2d at 245.
19 Id. at 246-47. The justification necessary to "purge this possible taint" must be in
the form of a summary explanation of the judge's reasons. There is no standard given as
to what reasons might be acceptable. On remand, Judge Murphy refused to reduce McGee's
sentence and elected to state his reasons for his denial of the Rule 35 motion. United States
v. McGee, 442 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The trial judge's annoyance with the Second
Circuit's decision was apparent in an opening remark: "We must first digress to call attention to some inadvertent statements in the majority opinion of the court, since they cast
a shadow on our judgement where none exists." Id. at 443. Recognizing that the court of
appeals thought the initial sentence excessive, he continued, "[I]n any event, we would
not reduce the sentence by one day no matter what the 'belief' of the Court of Appeals is.
The sentence is within the statutory limit and, as Judge Timbers said so cogently, 'It is
none of our appellate business."' Id. at 445. Finally, almost as an afterthought, Judge
Murphy stated what he considered sufficient legal justification to deny the Rule 35 motion
to reduce sentence on the three remaining counts:
whey were, in the judgment of the Congress and in ours, equally serious crimes;
they were each committed at different times than Count 1 and with each other...
in sum, each showed an uncompromising attitude and a callous disregard ... of
a law that he [McGee] did not approve and a desire to take the consequences as
a martyr,
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Dissenting Judge Timbers pointed out that the Second Circuit
"has never reversed, vacated or modified a discretionary order of a trial
judge on a Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence."20 He felt that appellate
courts have "absolutely no business" reviewing sentences of a trial
21

court.

Until the last few years, such a position was virtually unassailable. It was extremely rare for appellate courts to review sentences unless they were in excess of the statutory limit.22 Recently, however, in

United States v. Daniels,23 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered
the trial judge to impose a reduced sentence where the defendant had
been sentenced to the maximum period permitted and where there was
evidence of mitigating circumstances.
In United States v. Tucker,24 the trial judge, in sentencing Tucker,
gave consideration to his prior convictions which were later adjudged
constitutionally invalid as violative of the holding in Gideon v. Wainwright.25 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing "'without consideration of any prior convictions which are invalid ....

"26

The

government appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In
affirming, the Court acknowledged the broad, almost unlimited, discretion of a trial judge to determine what sentence to impose but held
that, under the facts of Tucker:
[T]hese general propositions do not decide the case before us.
For we deal here not with a sentence imposed in the informed
discretion of a trial judge, but with a sentence founded at least in
part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.27
In affirming this denial of the Rule 25 motion to reduce sentence, the court of appeals,
in a per curiam decision, noted:
[A] statement of reasons may be so perfunctory or otherwise inadequate as to
amount to a failure to provide a reasoned explanation, [but] we are unable to find
such to have been the case here and are now satisfied as to the independent
integrity of the sentences imposed on the three valid counts. Since the sentencing
judge has broad discretion within the statutory limits, it is not sufficient for reversal that we do not find the reasons for imposing two years' imprisonment on a
defendant with a concededly valid conscientious objection claim to be particularly
persuasive.
McGee v. United States, 465 F.2d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1972).
20462 F.2d at 247.
211d. at 253.
22See United States v. Moody, 395 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968); Flores v. United States,
238 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). But see
United States v. Ginzburg, 398 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1968).
23 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). Daniels was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses and
refused to perform alternate service on religious grounds. It was uncontested that this was
his sole motivation yet the judge imposed the maximum five-year sentence.
24 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
25372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970).
27 404 U.S. at 447.
.
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Yet another breach in the no appellate review of sentence wall may
be developing as a result of challenges to its constitutionality under
the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." 28 In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court, in a decision that
saw each of the five majority justices filing a separate opinion, held
that the discretionary imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel
and unusual punishment within the ambit of the eighth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions.3 0 The eighth amendment rationale
is not limited, at least in theory, to the imposition of the death sentences. It could be applied to any punishment that "does not comport
with human dignity"'81 or to a penalty that the law "... . inflicts upon
some people... [but] does not inffict upon others,"3 2 or that is "...
unacceptable to contemporary society."' 3 It is at least possible that these
descriptions may embrace an excessive but legal prison sentence.
At present, 13 states and the military court system have statutes
allowing appellate review of excessive but legal sentences. 34 The remaining states and the federal judiciary system have no such statutory
provisions for appellate review of sentences. On the national level, the
last 15 years have seen numerous congressional attempts to create a
28 U.S. CONsr. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
29 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman decision also applied to two other cases granted
certiorari at the same time: Jackson v. Georgia, 22 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); Branch
v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
30 U.S. CONsr. amend. VIII, XIV.
31408 U.S. 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 282.
3 Id. at 282.
34 Arizona, Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51-194, 51-195, 51-196 (Supp. 1972); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.41 (Supp. 1972);
Hawaii, HAWAu RaV. LAws § 212-14 (Supp. 1965); Illinois, hL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3
(c) (Supp. 1972); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1950); Maine, ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
2142-43 (Supp. 1972); Marylafid, M. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132-38 (Supp. 1971); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 278, § 28A-28C (Supp. 1972); Nebraska, NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 291308 (1964); New York, N.Y. CODE Cami. PRoc. §§ 543, 764 (McKinney 1958);
Oregon, ORE. Rav. STAT. §§ 138.050, 168.090 (1969 Repl. Part); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-2711 (1955). Connecticut, Maine, Maryland and Massachusetts allow the appellate tribunal to increase an inadequate sentence as well as decrease an excessive one.
In most jurisdictions, the appeal is to the regular appellate courts of the state but in
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Maryland the appeal is to a three-judge panel
composed of judges appointed by the highest judicial official of the state. Procedures and
availability and scope of review vary from state to state.
In the military court system, sentence may only be reduced. Appeal may be made to
either the convening authority, a board of review operating out of the Judge Advocate
General's Office or by the office of the Judge Advocate General itself. 10 U.S.C. §§ 860, 862
(b), 863-64, 865(a), 866(a)-(c), 869 (1970).
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statutory right of appeal in the federal courts.3 5 None have succeeded.38
However, as the instant case demonstrates, the federal courts have oc37
casionally circumvented this lack of statutory authority.
The principal reasons favoring enactment of legislation allowing
appellate review of sentences may be stated briefly:3 8
1) It would encourage respect for law and perhaps foster rehabilitation. Certainly the judicial system loses respect when the
occasional abuse of one judge goes uncorrected. Defendants
who receive sharp sentences in comparison to others treated
more leniently are likely to be embittered and unreceptive to
rehabilitation. 89
2) It would prevent the gross injustices that have been fostered
by the inability of appellate courts to correct excessively harsh
sentences. Appellate review would promptly cure such
sentences.40
36The following bills have been introduced by Senator Roman Hruska (R. Neb.):
S. 2722, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. 2879, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 1692, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1961); S. 2914, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Senator Estes Kefauver (D. Tenn.) introduced S. 1480, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). House bills introduced by Representative Kenneth Keating (R. N.Y.) were: H.R. 270, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) and by Representative
Thomas Lane (D. Mass.): H.R. 4932, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
36 The only exception to the lack of congressional approval is an extremely limited
right to appellate review of sentencing which is available to designated "special offenders"
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575, 3576 (1970).
This absence is all the more striking in that a comparison with other nations
indicates that those American jurisdictions failing to provide a remedy stand
largely alone in this respect.
Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make the PunishmentFit the Crime, 20 STA4N.
L. REv. 405, 406 (1968) [hereinafter Weigel].
37 Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366 (1968). Cf. Scarbeck v. United States, 317
F.2d 546, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 856 (1963); United States v. Wiley, 278
F.2d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1960).
Ss For a comprehensive study of the pros and cons of appellate review, see Appellate
Review of Sentences: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962) [hereinafter Symposium].
39 Respect for the legal system can be achieved through the prompt correction of
abuses. A system that allows the whims of one man to determine the fate of a defendant
is not likely to promote respect for the law. See A.B.A. PROjECr ON MINIMUr STANDARDS

Cf. Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation in OF PRISONS AND JusTcE,
S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 311 (1964).
FOR CRImINAL JusTicE, APPELLATE REvmiv oF SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968).

Defendants are often hostile when confronted by a judge with unlimited power. This
does not aid in the rehabilitation of the offender. It has been suggested that, if the defendant is aware that the judge's sentence is not final, it might not only eliminate the hostile
attitude but might be a positive step towards rehabilitation. See Note, Appellate Review
of PrimarySentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE LJ. 1453 (1960).
40 Examples of such excessive sentences are almost unlimited:

In recent years there have been cases, in at least one state, where consecutive sentences have run as high as 300 years. In one instance, involving a 17-year-old boy,
the sentence was 140 years, resulting from seven consecutive 20-year sentences for
a series of robberies all committed in one night.

Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of CriminalSentences, 21

BRooRyN L.
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3) It would create a rational and uniform sentencing policy. This
41
would lessen the incidence of disparate sentences.
4) Extensive study of one system of appellate review has shown
42
that it can work well.
REv. 2, 3 (1954) [hereinafter Sobeloff]. In another case, after a young man was blinded in
an accident, his wife left, taking their small children with her. After he recovered his
sight, needing money to locate his family, he robbed a bank. Feelings of remorse drove
him to turn himself in to the police. He received a sentence of 40 years. The average sentence for bank robbery at the time was less than 13 years. Kennedy, Justice is Found In the
Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 25 FED. PROB. 3, 4 (1961); 30 F.R.D. 401, 424-25 (1961).
The only relief now available from such sentences is executive clemency. This is, at
the very best, an extremely slow process. See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
COMMrrrEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME at 26 (1942).
It has been argued that, although executive clemency is available to correct excessive
sentences, the judiciary should be able to correct its own mistakes. Judicial errors of other
types are correctable on appeal but, in most jurisdictions in the United States, sentencing
errors are not.
[T]he standards governing the wise exercise of Executive clemency are by no means
the same standards which would be invoked to correct unjustified disparity in sentencing. Finally there is no right to Executive clemency. The victim of a serious
injustice ought to have a right to get it corrected.
Remarks of Judge Weigel, Appellate Review of Sentences Hearings on S. 2722 Before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1966).
41 "It is well recognized that where there are many trial judges and no power of appellate review, there is but little uniformity of sentencing policy." Sobeloff, supra note 40,
at 8. This does not mean that there should be no disparity in sentences. "Reasonable disparity is necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing." Weigel, supra note 36, at 405.
But excessive disparity is unjustifiable. See Rubin, Disparity and Equality of SentencesA Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1966); Institute of Judicial Administration,Disparity In Sentencing of Convicted Defendants (1954). The need for sentencing standards
for trial judges to follow is acute:
[1]n the difficult and important task of sentencing offenders, there are almost no
precedents or standards to follow. Since determining what sentence to impose has
nearly always been a matter of judicial discretion, few opinions have been written
to explain sentences. The knowledge and wisdom of individual judges have thus
died with them.
S. WARNER & H. CABOT, JUDGES AND LAw REFoRm 159-60 (1936). For a general treatment of
sentencing disparities, see JOINT CoMmrrrm ON CONTINUING IEGAL EDUCATION OF THE A.LI.
AND A.B.A., The Problem of Sentencing 56-77 (1962); McGuire and Holtzoff, The Problem
of Sentence in the Criminal Law, 20 B.U.L. REv. 423 (1940). See also M. PAULSEN AND S.
KADISH, CumMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 162-68 (1962).
42 In the United Kingdom, where the most extensive studies of the effect of appellate
review of sentences have been undertaken, the verdict is generally favorable. See Meador, The
Meador Report: A Report Submitted to the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice (1965). But success has not been universally achieved. See
Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69
YALE L.J. 1453 (1960); Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
521, 762 (1937). Reports of inadequacies and proposals for reform of sentencing procedures
in New York have recently received extensive press coverage. See 168 N.YL.J., Nov. 14,
1972, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1972, at 1, col. 6; Id., Sept. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2; id.,
Sept. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Chief Judge Fuld of the New York
Court of Appeals has proposed that sentencing power be removed from judges:
To minimize disparity in sentencing, it may ultimately be demonstrated that it
is desirable to commit to a correction authority or some other agency the responsibility and duty of determining the treatment to be accorded those convicted.
Id., Sept. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 1,
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5) Statistical studies have indicated there is more severe sentencing
of certain ethnic groups.43
Opponents of appellate review argue that it would lead to frivolous appeals, thus adding to already overloaded appellate calendars. 44
Also, they contend that trial judges are in the best position to determine appropriate punishment since they personally observe defendants.45
Despite these contentions, appellate review is gaining important
support. The American Bar Association46 and the Judicial Conference
of the United States47 have both endorsed appellate review and, re48
cently, a very limited statutory exception has appeared.
The case for appellate review is best summed up in the words of
Mr. Justice Stewart:
It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so

scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant
throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him
should have so neglected the most important dimension of fundamental justice. 49
If narrowly construed, the McGee holding will be of only limited
use in circumventing judicial reluctance to review criminal sentences.
However, if read broadly, McGee and its use of the Rule 35 motion
may, in the absence of positive statutory authority, be a decisive step
on the path to remedying this anomaly.
43 "(B]eing black generally means one type of sentence while being white means
another." Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52
J. CRIr. L. 411, 415 (1961). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 et seq. (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
44Although this seems to be the most telling argument against appellate review, it
does, as Congressman Cellar has noted, "completely evade the issue of whether an appeals
procedure is needed to insure the quality of justice that should characterize our courts."
Symposium, supra note 58, at 309. In addition, "appeal minded defendants have almost
invariably been able to find something to argue about, even when appeals have been
limited to the validity of the conviction, and have seldom seemed discouraged by the
chance of success appearing very small." Sobeloff, supra note 40, at 9-10.
45 Under all existing proposals, the trial judge would continue to have primary sententing responsibility but excessive sentences meted out due to his personal bias would be
subject to review by disinterested appellate court judges. For a discussion of this problem,
see Symposium, supra note 38.
46 A.B.A., PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSrICE, APPELLATE REVEW
OF SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968).

471964 Jun. CoNF. RE r., at 86; 1967 Jun. CoNF. REPr., at 79-80.

48 18 U.S.C. §§ 8575, 8576 (1970). Section 3576 allows review of sentences imposed on
persons adjudged special offenders under § 3575. Such special offenders are subject to
increased sentences. Review may be obtained by either the United States or the defendant.
Sentence may be decreased or increased by the appropriate court of appeals.
40 Shepherd v. United States, 257 F2,d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958).

